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OPACITY, FRAGILITY, & POWER
LESSONS FROM THE LAW
ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS
Gregory M. Gilchrist†
Review of MARY KREINER RAMIREZ & STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, THE
CASE FOR THE CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY: RESTORING LAW
AND ORDER ON WALL STREET (New York 2017)
INTRODUCTION
The institutional aggregation of wealth and opposition to
it are woven into our nation’s history like the wild grapevines and
clematis competing in my backyard. Neither seems to prevail with
any permanence, but in their ongoing seasonal contest they
sometimes threaten the trees on which they climb.
Andrew Jackson decried the Second Bank of the United
States as a “hydra of corruption.”1 In the years following the
2008 financial crisis, the phrase was eerily echoed2 by Rolling
† Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. J.D., Columbia. A.B.,
Stanford. I would like to thank Miriam Baer, Geoff Rapp, Lee Strang, and Evan Zoldan
for insightful comments on earlier versions of this review. I would also like to thank the
authors, Mary and Steve Ramirez, for inviting me to the 2016 Annual Institute for
Investor Protection Conference at the Loyola Chicago School of Law, where we debated
and developed many of the issues addressed herein. Finally, I would like to thank Anne
Conroy, Alexa Bordner, and the editorial staff at the Brooklyn Law Review for their
excellent work on this review.
1 See JON MEACHAM, AMERICAN LION: ANDREW JACKSON IN THE WHITE
HOUSE 256 (2008); see also S. G. HEISKELL, ANDREW JACKSON AND EARLY TENNESSEE
HISTORY 614 (1920) (letter to Rev. H. M. Cryer dated Apr. 7, 1833) (“I have no hesitation
to say, if they can recharter the bank, with its hydra of corruption, they will rule the nation,
and its charter will be perpetual, and its corrupting influence destroy the liberty of our
country.”). Jackson “thought that the Second Bank’s monopoly over government finances
gave Biddle and his friends undue profits and power.” Charles W. Murdock, The Big
Banks: Background, Deregulation, Financial Innovation, and “Too Big to Fail”, 90 DENV.
U. L. REV. 505, 509 (2012).
2 The echo is of course imperfect. Whereas Taibbi expressed concerns about
the aggregation of wealth and power in America’s largest banks, the source of Jackson’s
concern is both more nuanced and controversial. Jackson’s rhetoric about corruption
sounds akin to Taibbi’s, albeit about an institution that was itself a quasi-government
entity with regulatory authority over state banks. Some have argued Jackson was an
“instrument of the private banks” that faced and opposed regulation by the national

647

648

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:2

Stone reporter Matt Taibbi who described Goldman Sachs as a
“great vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity,
relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like
money.”3 Concerns about the manner in which wealth is channeled,
the power that accompanies it, and the impact of both on the rule
of law are never far from the surface in American politics.
The fight, which might be understood as a specific
iteration of the tension between liberty and equality, continues.4
The financial crisis of 2008 provided a critical, if undesired,
moment to consider the status of banks in America. The
aftermath of that crisis, including the limited law enforcement
response, provides another. The Case for the Corporate Death
Penalty, a new book by Mary Kreiner Ramirez and Steven A.
Ramirez, gathers copious evidence and makes the case that the
size and power of our largest financial institutions has rendered
them effectively above the law.5 The nation suffered greatly
during and after the 2008 financial crisis. The effects continue
to reverberate through industries as disparate as technology,
automotive, education, and law. Understanding what caused the
crisis and how it might be avoided is in both the national interest
and the personal interest of almost every American. The Case
for the Corporate Death Penalty is a vital resource for developing
a more fulsome understanding.6
The story is well written and clear. The authors’ central
thesis is that the law enforcement response to one of the worst
bank. See Bray Hammond, Jackson, Biddle, and the Bank of the United States, 7 J. ECON.
HIST. 1, 8 (1947). Others suggest that “the entire debate was powerfully shaped by
tensions between agrarian debtor interests and the interests of entrepreneurs and
financiers.” Norman W. Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism in the Department
of Justice, 63 STAN. L. REV. 409, 421 (2011). Nuances aside, however, the Bank of the
United States’ power, corruption, and the populist reaction to each, fueled the dispute. Id.
(“Many of the most outspoken supporters of the Bank were in fact on the dole of Nicholas
Biddle; Jackson plainly saw political advantage in using the Bank as an easy target upon
which to play out his populist agenda . . . .”).
3 Matt Taibbi, The Great American Bubble Machine, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 5,
2010), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-great-american-bubble-machine20100405 [https://perma.cc/7ZZ9-MB83].
4 See, e.g., Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in
Constitutional Theory, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1445, 1470 (2016) (describing an array of
normative theories that differ on the question of whether “elite economic domination” is
even a problem). Steve Ramirez, one of the authors of the reviewed book, is not new to
this fight. See generally STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM: THE SUBPRIME
CRISIS AND THE CASE FOR AN ECONOMIC RULE OF LAW (2014).
5 See generally MARY KREINER RAMIREZ & STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, THE CASE FOR
THE CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY: RESTORING LAW AND ORDER ON WALL STREET (2017)
[hereinafter RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY].
6 As we pass a series of ten-year anniversaries from the financial crisis,
interest in the causes of and fallout from the crisis, as well as the weak law enforcement
response to it, continues. See, e.g., JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FAILS TO PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES (2017).
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financial crises in the nation’s history cannot be excused. They
contend that the failure to more vigorously prosecute those
responsible for the crisis not only deeply undermines respect for the
criminal justice system, but also represents a historic, and possibly
unique, breakdown in the rule of law. Firmly rejecting the official
explanations as to why there were not more prosecutions, the
authors ultimately conclude that the “DOJ’s behavior can be
explained only as an exercise of discretion in favor of the most
wealthy and powerful individuals in our society.”7
The book opens with a brief history of white collar
prosecutions in America, making the case that power and
influence have not always protected wrongdoers.8 The core of the
book, five chapters each dedicated to an exemplar of fiscal
malfeasance, provides an outstanding overview of the financial
crisis. These chapters begin with Countrywide’s creation and
sale of toxic mortgages,9 following the path through Wall Street’s
repackaging the mortgages into securities,10 Lehman’s dubious
accounting,11 AIG’s reckless overextension into credit default
swaps,12 and Goldman’s duplicity in selling securities.13 Each
chapter further explains the nonexistent or limited law
enforcement response to the malfeasance, and presents
arguments that prosecutions were possible. A final substantive
chapter introduces a series of crimes committed by banks after
the financial crisis, arguing that the enforcement failure during
the crisis led to greater misconduct in its wake.14
It’s now an oft-repeated and bemoaned fact that the
federal government brought very few individual criminal
prosecutions in the wake of the crisis.15 The Case for the
Corporate Death Penalty argues that there could have and
should have been a more vigorous law enforcement response,
that law enforcement’s failures stem from the corrupting power

RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 5, at 201.
Id. at 29–59.
9 Id. at 59–85.
10 Id. at 86–108.
11 Id. at 109–32.
12 Id. at 133–54.
13 Id. at 59–177.
14 Id. at 178–202.
15 See Sara Sun Beale, The Development and Evolution of the U.S. Law of
Corporate Criminal Liability and the Yates Memo, 46 STETSON L. REV. 41, 66 (2016)
(“Public opinion polls consistently showed broad support for more prosecutions after the
2008 financial crisis. The majority of the public—seventy-nine percent in one survey—
wanted prosecutors to find the people who were responsible for the financial crash and
send them to jail.” (footnotes omitted)).
7

8
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of large banks, and that this entire situation poses grave risks
to our legal system and the legitimacy of government.16
In this essay, I examine both the book’s method and
conclusions. In each I find much to admire and some to dispute.
A central question posed by the book is why were there so few
prosecutions? On this question, I part ways with the authors,
arguing that there are likely good explanations for much of what
looks like a law enforcement failure. Our differences on this
point, however, are limited and arguably immaterial. In the end,
the reasons for a limited law enforcement response are less
important than the fact that the response was so limited. The
harms identified by the authors are real and ought to be addressed.
The question that remains is how best to do so. The authors favor
more prosecutions; I would prefer better regulation. Our difference
on this point is significant; however, whether one favors
prosecution or regulation, The Case of the Corporate Death Penalty
provides critical tools to understand the problem and assess
potential solutions.
I.

METHODOLOGY: SOURCING AND TELLING THE STORY

The book makes a compelling case. People will differ on
specific issues and the overall conclusions,17 but few would argue
that the law enforcement response to the crisis was exemplary.
The dominant impression remains that the crisis was spawned
of, and generated, fraud, yet very little effort went into
punishing those frauds.18
A.

A Scholarly Effort to Engage the Public

The Case for the Corporate Death Penalty seeks to engage
the public, while maintaining scholarly rigor. The authors have
correctly concluded that, if there are to be any changes to
RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 5, at 3-4.
See generally Daniel C. Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 265 (2014) (arguing that assertions of widespread law enforcement failure
following the crisis are overstated and describing why the macro-level conclusions of the
Financial Inquiry Commission bear little relation to the sorts of specific evidence needed
to support specific charges); see also Miriam H. Baer, Book Review, Too Vast to Succeed,
114 MICH. L. REV. 1109, 1134 (2016) (reviewing BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL:
HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS (2014)) (“[M]uch of the behavior
that produced the 2008 financial crisis, although irresponsible and risky, was not
necessarily criminal fraud.”); Beale, supra note 15, at 67. (“[I]t is questionable how much
of the conduct that led to the 2008 crisis can be properly called criminal, rather than
actionable solely under civil law theories.”).
18 See Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives
Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/
2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/ [https://perma.cc/M2U5-EAMF].
16

17
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address what they describe as the power, influence, and lack of
accountability on Wall Street, it will only be because the public
demands them. The book’s audience is thus no narrower than
the informed citizenry.
The crisis certainly revealed failures of policy and
leadership. In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, few
individuals suffered as significant a loss of face as Alan
Greenspan.19 As the engines of civilization teetered on a
precipice, people began to suggest that better regulation and
fraud prevention in the financial sector might have served as a
sort of trail marker to prevent society from marching to that
dangerous edge.20 And there was no more-powerful and highprofile advocate against such measures than the former
Chairman.21 One can only hope that those who would follow
Greenspan’s path will read this book and at least moderate their
trust in utterly unfettered markets.
The book aspires, however, to an even higher goal than
informing those in charge. It seeks to inform the public by
19 See, e.g., Martin Wolf, The Man in the Dock: Was Alan Greenspan to blame
for the financial crisis?, ECONOMIST, (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.economist.com/news/
books-and-arts/21707908-was-alan-greenspan-blame-financial-crisis-man-dock [https://
perma.cc/6HBB-J4QP] (“The former chairman of the Federal Reserve was once a hero.
Now he is being called a villain.”). Of course, this view is not undisputed, and even the
quoted source continues, “[y]et it is too soon to be sure what history will say about him.”
Id. But it remains correct that few were more closely associated with and revered for the
booming economy that preceded the crash, and thus few more obviously positioned for
tragic readjustment.
20 See Edmund J. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at B1, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/
24panel.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=B083EBBE1469E076943DF5E9F6D1
BDCF&gwt=pay [https://perma.cc/YZ25-859R] (“Now 82, Mr. Greenspan came in for one
of the harshest grillings of his life, as Democratic lawmakers asked him time and again
whether he had been wrong, why he had been wrong and whether he was sorry.”). The
article adds:

Critics, including many economists, now blame the former Fed chairman for
the financial crisis that is tipping the economy into a potentially deep
recession. Mr. Greenspan’s critics say that he encouraged the bubble in
housing prices by keeping interest rates too low for too long and that he failed
to rein in the explosive growth of risky and often fraudulent mortgage lending.
Id.

21 The former chairman consistently opposed regulation and favored a laissezfaire approach to the financial sector. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF
THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 34 (2011) [hereinafter FCIC
FINAL REPORT], http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_
full.pdf [https://perma.cc/PFC9-WMNW] (“Those of us who support market capitalism in its
more competitive forms might argue that unfettered markets create a degree of wealth that
fosters a more civilized existence. I have always found that insight compelling.”); see also id.
at 94 (“If there is egregious fraud, if there is egregious practice, one doesn’t need
supervision and regulation, what one needs is law enforcement.” (quoting Alan
Greenspan in DAVID FABER, AND THEN THE ROOF CAVED IN: HOW WALL STREET’S GREED
AND STUPIDITY BROUGHT CAPITALISM TO ITS KNEES, 53–54 (2009))).

652

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:2

adopting a sourcing methodology that favors transparency; not
transparency just for lawyers, judges, and scholars, but one that
serves the public as a whole. In describing these events and
arguing for a stronger response by law enforcement, the authors
do not ask the reader to accept or reject the book’s conclusions
only on intuition or emotion. “[W]e have strived to make the
basis of our conclusion as transparent as possible. Therefore,
whenever possible we employed Internet-based sources that are
easily accessible to as many citizens as possible.”22
This claim will generate some skepticism, as Internet
sourcing is notoriously problematic. The book fortunately
overcomes the skepticism, but the concern is worth acknowledging.
As Suzanna Sherry describes the problem in terms of Wikipedia,
“[w]ith the general public rather than experts as the source of
(and primary check on) Wikipedia’s content, misinformation is
bound to creep in.”23 Recent trends exacerbate this concern.24 Yet
the concern is not realized in this book. The sourcing is, for the
most part, either primary (e.g., an opinion by Judge Rakoff in
the case alleging fraud against Countrywide25) or expertauthority secondary (e.g., the Final Report of the National
Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis
in the United States,26 authored by an “independent, [ten]member panel . . . composed of private citizens with experience
in areas such as housing, economics, finance, market regulation,
banking, and consumer protection”27). True, some sources are not
available online and some online sources are less compelling than
primary or expert-authored secondary sources, but the balance
works. Key contentions are supported by strong sources, and
much of the source material is readily available to the reader.
This effort is admirable. The marketplace of ideas has
become cluttered. There is too much information and too little
curation, and one can find support for almost anything. On the
22 RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 5, at xii. Lest
a reliance on Internet-based sourcing appear somehow un-serious to academic readers,
I should clarify that the sourcing is excellent and that many of the “best primary
sources,” dealing with the events leading up to and following the financial crisis are
available on the Internet. Id.; see, e.g., FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 21.
23 Suzanna Sherry, Democracy and the Death of Knowledge, 75 U. CIN. L. REV.
1053, 1055 (2007).
24 Nabiha Syed, Real Talk About Fake News: Towards A Better Theory for
Platform Governance, 127 YALE L.J. F. 337, 337 (2017) (“Following the 2016 U.S.
presidential election, ‘fake news’ has dominated popular dialogue and is increasingly
perceived as a unique threat to an informed democracy.”).
25 RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 5, at 64
(citing United States ex rel. O’Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d
494 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev’d and remanded 822 F.3d 650 (2d Cir. 2016)).
26 FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 21.
27 Id. at xi.
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other hand, ever-increasing levels of specialization render our
best sources of information unintelligible to the lay person. The
reader may have some understanding of HDL and LDL
cholesterol, Saturn’s moons, and ice melt in Greenland, but her
understanding is almost certainly predicated on secondary and
tertiary sources (at best). Comprehending the primary sources
is reserved for a small subset of specialists, and replicating or
confirming conclusions remains the province of a handful of
people,28 few if any of whom could shift readily even between
these three examples.
As the scope of knowledge has grown, our grasp of it is
ever-more attenuated. And the financial sector is no exception.
Indeed, opacity of information within fragmented systems was a
contributing factor leading to the financial crisis.29 So few people
could understand the forces at play, that the entire nation and
much of the world walked unaware into jeopardy.30
The Ramirezes’ book aims to shift this dynamic, by
inviting and empowering the reader to check the authors’
conclusions.31 Why? Because, as the authors write, “our ultimate
conclusion—that an unprecedented breakdown in the rule of law
occurred in our nation after the greatest financial collapse in
28 See Sherry, supra note 23 at 1054 (“expertise (especially scientific expertise)
is the deepest and most specialized that it has ever been”).
29 See GILLIAN TETT, THE SILO EFFECT: THE PERIL OF EXPERTISE AND THE
PROMISE OF BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS at ix–xi (2015) (attributing fragmentation and
its accompanying limits on the exchange of information as a reason for the crisis).

[A]s I dug into the 2008 crisis I also saw a world where different teams of
financial traders at the big banks did not know what each other was doing,
even inside the same (supposedly integrated) institution. I heard how
government officials were hamstrung by the fact that the big regulatory
agencies and central banks were crazily fragmented, not just in terms of their
bureaucratic structures, but also their worldview.
Id. at x.

30 This failing continues unabated. As “Kevin Warsh, an ex–Morgan Stanley
banker and a former Federal Reserve Board member appointed by George W. Bush,”
describes the problem:

Investors can’t truly understand the nature and quality of the assets and
liabilities. They can’t readily assess the reliability of the capital to offset losses.
They can’t assess the underlying sources of the firms’ profits. The disclosure
obfuscates more than it informs, and the government is not just permitting it
but seems to be encouraging it.
Frank Partnoy & Jesse Eisinger, What’s Inside America’s Banks?, ATLANTIC, Jan. 2013,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/01/whats-inside-americas-banks/
309196/ [https://perma.cc/3PHF-UMBK].
31 Not literally or perfectly, of course. The authors are academic experts on
corporate governance, financial regulation, and criminal law, and the value of their book
comes from not only their curation but their ability to explain the material in an informed
way. That said, by directing the reader to accessible source material, the authors have
made their book more useful to those who wish to inquire further.
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history—is something that every citizen must reflect upon.”32
The stakes could not be larger: the book contends that the failure
to prosecute individuals for fraud or other crimes in the
aftermath of the crisis is nothing short of a grant of immunity
by the U.S. government to the most politically and economically
powerful who control large financial institutions.33
For most of us, the financial sector is out of our hands. What
little consumer influence we have is as inconsequential as our
respective investments, and even that influence we surrender to
index or mutual funds.34 Of course, we can hope that future leaders
will chart a wiser course, but we also can vote. The democratic
check is limited and indirect, but it exists, and there is no more
reliable method to introduce fiscal responsibility on Wall Street
than for the people to demand it.35
The complexity of the financial system might lead some to
give up on the prospect of a democratic check. This would be a
mistake. To get lost amidst complexity is to ignore human
capacity to identify larger, simpler patterns. The Ramirezes’
book recognizes this potential and invites the reader to do just
that. By writing an accessible book, and sourcing it in an
accessible way, the authors invite and empower the public to join
RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 5, at xii.
Id. at 1 (describing “[a] [n]ew [c]riminal [i]mmunity for a [n]ew [e]conomic
[r]oyalty”). It is too soon to measure the degree to which the public lost confidence in the
financial sector and the rule of law as a result of the crisis and the law enforcement
response. It is also probably too soon to identify the impacts of any such loss of confidence
with much precision. However, some have begun associating the recent electoral shift
toward populism, on both sides of the Atlantic, with the financial crisis. See Martin Wolf, The
Economic Origins of the Populist Surge, FIN. TIMES, June 27, 2017, https://www.ft.com/
content/5557f806-5a75-11e7-9bc8-8055f264aa8b [https://perma.cc/SZ6Z-K2NB] (“This, I
suggest, is why Mr. Trump is US president and the British chose Brexit. Cultural change and
the economic decline of the working classes increased disaffection. But the financial crisis
opened the door to a populist surge.”).
34 Investor influence over a particular entity is limited to the scope of
ownership. “[G]overnance, for the vast majority of companies, is based on a proportional
relationship between voting power and economic ownership: one share, one vote.” Henry
T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and
Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 632 (2008). Investor influence over an entire industry is
even more diluted. And, the influence of individual investors has been eroded by institutional
investing. See Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 117, 127 (1988) (“By 1980, the effective mobilization of individual shareholders
had become mathematically impossible in many corporations because of the shift of
shareholdings from individuals to institutions.”).
35 Of course, such a democratic check, were it to succeed, could do so only
through the channeled mechanics of republican government. Pure populist control over
the financial system would be far worse than any and all of the problems posed by Wall
Street; classic republicanism offers promise of balance between an unregulated financial
system and one subject to the whims of popular prejudice. See generally GORDON S.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 (University of North Carolina
Press 1998) (1969). That said, in this era of agency capture and/or a laissez-faire philosophy
dominating banks and their regulators alike, functional republicanism—and hence a
functional regulatory system—will likely be reliant on popular pressure.
32

33
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the discussion about how the financial sector ought to be
governed. The push for sensible regulation of the industry
cannot succeed absent popular demand, and understanding
what happened is necessary to any such demand.
B.

A Powerful Narrative

The 2008 financial crisis involves tragedy, greed, angst,
and drama; The Case for the Corporate Death Penalty captures
these well. To avoid the emotion and human cost of the crisis would
be to tell only a partial story. The risk, however, is that the more
emotional aspects of telling could influence policy conclusions.
A push for sensible regulation should not be conflated
with a push for prosecution. As Dan Richman wrote, “I suspect
(but cannot prove) that the loudest calls for corporate executive
prosecutions come from those who would have preferred more
regulatory controls on corporate behavior before 2008 and who
aren’t satisfied with the regulatory response since then.”36 Some
who read this book will leave convinced that more individuals
ought to have been prosecuted following the financial crisis. Others
who read this book will leave convinced that, at least in the
financial industry, there ought to be “more regulatory controls on
corporate behavior.”37 I find myself in the latter camp.
The Case for the Corporate Death Penalty amplifies its
voice by presenting a compelling and fascinating read. At times,
however, the book risks undercutting its case by overstating it. For
example, the book contends that the law enforcement response, or
lack thereof, to the financial crisis was historically anomalous.
The recent legal indulgences granted to financial elites for financial
crimes stand without precedent in the modern American economy.
Between the end of World War II and the 2008 financial crisis, in the
United States even the most powerful business leaders faced criminal
accountability for significant financial crimes.38

The premise, however, is problematic. The history of law
enforcement is complex, and while it includes instances of
prosecuting the powerful, it is difficult to imagine that power,
privilege, and wealth never thwarted financial investigations
before 2008.39
Richman, supra note 17, at 280.
Id. In part because the former is basically a subset of the latter.
38 RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 5, at 29
(emphasis added).
39 A fair response would be to point to my absence of examples where power,
privilege, and wealth thwarted criminal investigations before 2008. I offer none. Here I
run into a foundational challenge that the authors also confronted. In the absence of a
36
37
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Indeed, one of the book’s central examples of vigorous law
enforcement against the powerful—following the S&L Savings
and Loan Crisis—was not always so understood. “[T]o celebrate
the S & L Crisis response as the epitome of a white-collar
crackdown is to rewrite history. The Justice Department was
similarly excoriated for its lameness back then.”40
The book also relies on the Enron prosecutions as an
example of power falling before blind justice. The reason for this
choice is clear: those prosecutions successfully reached to the
Olympian heights of Kenneth Lay—not only the former
chairman and CEO, but also a close friend and supporter of the
then-sitting President and his two predecessors.41 Arguing that
the Enron prosecutions represent the norm, the book contends
that through most of our nation’s history, power, privilege, and
access were impotent against the rule of law.
Enron, however, is a weak proxy for the aftermath of the
financial crisis as it involved the failure of a single entity
predicated on plain financial misstatements.42 The process of
identifying wrongdoers and allocating blame was far simpler
than it could ever have been for wrongdoing that spanned not
only multiple firms, but also many industries and even the
private and public sectors.
To the extent these examples are offered in support of the
claim that power does not necessarily provide immunity, they
work. However, the claim that power has never provided
immunity as it did following 2008 is more questionable.
In this way, the book arguably errs in favor of the
powerful narrative, and this has the tendency to shift the
emphasis from regulation to prosecution. The book’s “ultimate
conclusion—that an unprecedented breakdown in the rule of law
occurred in our nation after the greatest financial collapse in
history,”43 lends itself to the conclusion that more prosecutions
criminal prosecution it is difficult to identify a particular non-prosecution as a failure.
First, there is no process. Second, and more critically, the best tools for gathering
evidence are controlled by the government. See id. at xii–xiii. Accordingly, those who
would criticize a non-prosecution are generally at a distinct informational disadvantage.
The authors earn significant credibility by acknowledging this limit clearly in the preface
to the book, and bolster that credibility by their careful and painstaking aggregation of
the best available evidence.
40 Richman, supra note 17, at 266–67.
41 RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 5, at 31.
42 Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1233, 1233–34 (2003) (“[M]arket faith collapsed when Enron acknowledged that
the transactions with the related-party partnerships allowed Enron to inflate its
earnings for the last five years and keep billions of dollars of contingent liabilities off its
balance sheet.”).
43 RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 5, at xii.
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were necessary. But, one can fairly ask—even while bothered by
the limited consequences for misconduct on Wall Street—did we
really experience an unprecedented breakdown in the rule of
law? Maybe instead we witnessed the failure of regulators and
regulations to govern the massive aggregation of wealth and the
power that accompanies it.
A book contending that there ought to be more civil
regulation of bankers could never capture public attention like a
book arguing law enforcement bowed before power. The public
clamors for indictments following a crisis, but that does not
mean prosecutions are preferable.44 Elsewhere, I have argued
that there are good reasons to prefer civil regulation of banks
and bankers over criminal prosecutions.45 No doubt, for the vast
majority of Americans who suffered as a result of the crisis, it
wouldn’t be as cathartic. But it might be better policy.
II.

EXPLAINING THE LACK OF PROSECUTIONS STEMMING
FROM THE CRISIS

The Case for the Corporate Death Penalty maintains that
the tepid law enforcement response to the financial crisis can
only be explained by the power and wealth of Wall Street. “Only
raw economic and political power can account for [the] gross
injustice” of failing to seek criminal sanctions against individuals
in the wake of the financial crisis.46
The financial crisis was built on greed and
misrepresentations.47 Lenders pushed home buyers into riskier
44 The public demand for prosecutions is powerful and cannot be discounted.
Sara Beale has written about how public demand—not a recognized theory of
punishment—has crept into the DOJ explanations of the Yates Memorandum that
nudges prosecutors toward more prosecutions of individuals. See Beale, supra note 15,
at 65 (In describing the rationales for the new DOJ policy, “Yates’ separate emphasis on
holding the proper parties ‘responsible’ seems to strike a retributive note, and it is
difficult to connect her final comment about public confidence in the justice system with
any of the standard theories of punishment.”). Beale’s essay ends with a series of
challenging questions about interaction, both functional and normative, between public
opinion and the prosecutorial function. Id. at 67.
45 Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Special Problem of Banks and Crime, 85 COLO. L.
REV. 1 (2014).
46 RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 5, at 6.
47 It was also built on hope and aspiration. It is important to remember how
embedded the ideal of home ownership was in American culture and how that ideal was
reflected in government policy. As the FCIC explained: “All these factors” contributing
to the problematic growth of nontraditional mortgages “were supplemented by
government policies, many of which had been in effect for decades, that subsidized
homeownership but created hidden costs to taxpayers and the economy. Elected officials
of both parties pushed housing subsidies too far.” FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at
424. Moreover, it is probably no accident that these years of real estate excess followed
the dot-com bubble of the late 1990s. The push to move money into real estate and away
from the speculative and ephemeral might be understood as a laudable effort to diversify.
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and riskier mortgages,48 including no-document loans and “liar’s
loans.”49 The same lenders failed to disclose to their own investors
or the purchasers of the mortgages the increasing toxicity of the
underlying product.50 Wall Street firms then packaged the
mortgages into securities and sold them, without disclosing the
underlying risks and sometimes covering up the method of
packaging the security, which itself would have revealed the
risks.51 As the house of cards began to collapse, institutions holding
the riskiest assets issued misleading assurances and engaged in
unduly creative accounting.52 Ratings agencies added to the crisis,53
as did, arguably, any number of government officials and
employees.54 It’s an ugly story and few escape it untarnished.
It is therefore understandable that so much abuse has
been heaped on banks and the financial industry generally.
Understandable, but also unfortunate. Under the present
circumstances, it is too easy to forget that the financial industry
serves the public, introducing liquidity without which all but the
wealthiest would be subject to the whims of their financial
superiors. As Nicholas Biddle argued before the Pennsylvania
legislature in defense of the Bank of the United States: banks
represent “‘the most natural way of protecting the poorer classes
of society’ from oppression by the rich.”55 That banks benefit
society ought not be controversial, and it probably isn’t.
However, it is a testament to the public anger at the largest and
As with any cultural trend, there is no one explanation for the excess that occurred in
the mortgage industry; but as with most forms of excess, it fed off of greed and
misrepresentations.
48 RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 5, at 24.
49 Charles W. Murdock, Why Not Tell the Truth?: Deceptive Practices and the
Economic Meltdown, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 801, 843 (2010). These are not terms of art, but
they seem to have entered the lexicon in the 2000s and become more common following the
crisis. Both refer to loans without sufficient verification of assets. “Stated income” loans
had long been available to small business owners who lacked simple documentation to
establish income. Id. These loans were made more widely available in the 2000s, allowing
people to misstate their assets and income, and in some cases avoiding any stated assets
or income altogether. See Id.; see also Mark Ireland, After the Storm: Asymmetrical
Information, Game Theory, and an Examination of the “Minnesota Model” for National
Regulation of Mortgage Brokers and Tomorrow’s Predatory Lenders, 36 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1, 21 (2009) (“Even after the loans acquired the nickname ‘liar’s loans’ and it was
well known that the stated information was very likely to be false, such loans continued
to be originated based upon an applicant’s high credit score.”).
50 RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 5, at 24.
51 Id. at 86, 162.
52 Id. at 25.
53 Id. at 103.
54 Id. at 119, 149.
55 THOMAS PAYNE GOVAN, NICHOLAS BIDDLE: NATIONALIST AND PUBLIC
BANKER 1786–1844 31 (1959) (“Credit provided by these institutions, either directly or
through merchants, enabled farmers, Craftsmen, and manufacturers to reserve their
products for an advantageous market instead of sacrificing them to meet immediate
needs . . . .”).
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most powerful financial institutions that Biddle’s simple
admonition sounds so odd today.
This real and well-founded anger has led many to demand
criminal consequences for the harm caused by the financial crisis.
Few such consequences followed. More problematic, according to
The Case for the Corporate Death Penalty, is that the law
enforcement response as a whole—from the investigation stage
and on—was limited. For example, whereas the law enforcement
response to Enron was swift and dramatic, there was nothing
comparable following the financial crisis. The costs of financial
improprieties were both severe and incredibly widespread.
Indeed, the 2008 financial crisis by almost any measure inflicted
far greater harms than Enron’s failure.56 Were justice meted out
in accord with demand, the consequences of the more recent
crisis should have been quite severe. They weren’t.
There are three most likely explanations for this lack of
individual prosecutions. First, there was insufficient evidence of
wrongdoing on behalf of individuals to justify prosecution.
Second, uncertainty surrounding the financial sector in a time
of crisis caused regulators and prosecutors to fear using their
more powerful tools to punish misconduct. Third, times had
changed such that power—at least in the financial sector—was
sufficient to insulate the powerful from prosecution.57 The book
leans heavily on the third of these explanations.

56 See FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at xv (Three years after the crisis,
“there are more than 26 million Americans who are out of work, cannot find full-time
work, or have given up looking for work. About four million families have lost their homes
to foreclosure and another four and a half million have slipped into the foreclosure
process or are seriously behind on their mortgage payments. Nearly $11 trillion in
household wealth has vanished, with retirement accounts and life savings swept away.”).
57 I am omitting here a fourth possible explanation: government involvement
in the conduct leading to the financial crisis may have made the government reluctant
to investigate and prosecute potential crimes. Judge Rakoff has suggested that one
“reason for not bringing such cases is the government’s own involvement in the
underlying circumstances that led to the financial crisis.” Rakoff, supra note 18. The
book also touches on this explanation by noting that Lehman’s CEO actually offered as
a sort of defense in his testimony before Congress the presence and review by Fed and
SEC agents in the months leading to bankruptcy. RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, CORPORATE
DEATH PENALTY, supra note 5, at 119. By omitting this rationale, I do not mean to
discount the possibility that government involvement played a role in the limited
response of law enforcement; rather, this explanation is both more limited in scope and
more subtle in effect than the others. For example, the presence of government agents
at Lehman could have a number of different impacts on law enforcement decisions: it
might dissuade some from investigating for fear of embarrassing their own;
alternatively, it might dissuade some from investigating because it suggests a lack of
mens rea on the part of Lehman personnel who interpreted government presence as
“tacit approval.” Id. The book returns to this question of government involvement with
regard to AIG. Id. at 150.
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I have argued otherwise.58 The first possible explanation
for the lack of individual prosecutions is lack of evidence. The
complexity and opacity of the large financial institutions coupled
with the difficulty of white collar prosecutions led to sound
prosecutorial declinations.
Simply put, it is one thing to show that “[m]oney
laundering, lying to federal agents, perjury, market manipulation,
and bid rigging . . . unquestionably occurred in the run-up to the
crash of 2008 and continued in its aftermath.”59 It is quite another,
however, to prove in a court of law that a particular individual
committed even one of these crimes in a particular way at a
particular time. For example, with regard to the sale of mortgagebacked securities the book states that “there can be no dispute
that Wall Street sold hundreds of billions in fraudulent
mortgage-backed securities,” and “[t]he only remaining issue is
which individuals at which megabanks acted with scienter—or
intent to defraud.”60 These lines are densely packed, but it’s
worth pausing to consider a few points. Fraudulent modifies the
mortgage-backed securities (MBS), not the act of selling.61 The
MBS’s were “fraudulent,” in that they were comprised of assets
originated by Countrywide and others through a scheme
designed to mask risky mortgages as prime.62 But for the sale to
be fraudulent, the seller would need to act with intent to
defraud, requiring at least recklessness with regard to the
veracity of claims regarding the sale.63 Accordingly, “the only
remaining issue” is everything.
Proving that a particular individual at one institution
sold securities with intent to defraud because of a scheme at a
different institution is no small task. Scienter is often the most
challenging, and often the only contested, issue in white collar
cases.64 So, the absence of clear evidence on this key issue is no
small thing. Having said this, I will add that I do not doubt the
58 See Gilchrist, supra note 45, at 41; see also Kathleen F. Brickey, Enron’s
Legacy, 8 BUFFALO CRIM. L. REV. 221, 275 (2004) (“Contrary to what skeptical observers
often say, these cases do not reflect prosecutorial footdragging. They demonstrate the
complexity of the work required to build a solid case against top executives of
corporations that engaged in elaborately concealed, long-term schemes to defraud.”).
59 RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 5, at 5.
60 Id. at 88.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 61–62 (describing the High Speed Swim Lane, or Hustle, program at
Countrywide).
63 See 1A FED. JURY PRAC. & INSTR. § 16:08 (6th ed.) (“A statement, claim or
document is ‘fraudulent’ if it was falsely made or made with reckless indifference as to
its truth or falsity and made or caused to be made with an intent to deceive.”).
64 Joseph W. Yockey, FCPA Settlement, Internal Strife, and the “Culture of
Compliance”, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 689, 695 (2012) (“[I]ssues of mens rea are often the most
difficult elements in FCPA and other white-collar crime cases to prove.”).
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authors’ contention; indeed, the book’s catalogue of misconduct
leaves little room for doubt that fraud occurred in the sale of
MBS’s, if only from the overall weight of evidence. But that is
different than what is needed to convince a jury to return a guilty
verdict in a particular case against a particular individual.
Therefore, I would have difficulty concluding there was a
nefarious explanation for the lack of prosecutions simply because
there almost surely were frauds that went unprosecuted.
So too, the second possible explanation should not be
discounted. The stakes were nigh unprecedented. The FCIC
described its charge in investigating the crisis as follows: “how
did it come to pass that in 2008 our nation was forced to choose
between two stark and painful alternatives—either risk the total
collapse of our financial system and economy or inject trillions of
taxpayer dollars into the financial system and an array of
companies, as millions of Americans still lost their jobs, their
savings, and their homes?”65 Total collapse of our financial
system. This was on the table. Timothy Geithner wrote that “[w]e
had slipped into an economic black hole,” and worried that “we
were looking at another global depression that would hurt
billions of people.”66 The FCIC Report plainly concluded that this
crisis was avoidable, and that it was rooted in regulatory and
ethical failures.67 But once it was upon us, the scope and danger
of the crisis was every bit as massive as apologists for the
government claim.
The book catalogues the extensive powers of U.S.
regulators—including the FDIC, OCC, Federal Reserve Board,
and SEC—over financial institutions.68 These powers extend to
what might be described as the power to effectively impose a
corporate death penalty, and that power could have been
leveraged to generate individual prosecutions.69 But one must
wonder, would anyone really have been willing to use these
powers in 2008 or 2009 if given the opportunity to do so?70 The
FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at xvi (emphasis in original).
Robert Lenzner, The 2008 Financial Collapse Was Worse Than 1929, Geithner
Insists, FORBES (June 22, 2014, 11:05 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertlenzner/
2014/06/22/the-2008-financial-collapse-was-worse-than-1929/#212e28fd5f35 [https://
perma.cc/F6A8-JNPM] (reviewing TIMOTHY GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON
FINANCIAL CRISES (2014)).
67 FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at xvii–xxii.
68 RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 5, at 11–13.
69 Id.
70 In fairness, the authors are careful to describe the applicable limitations
period for each alleged crime and would contend that prosecutions could have been
brought well after the uncertainty of the crisis had subsided. Still, one wonders about
the viability (or desirability) of existential threats against one or more of the largest,
most interconnected financial institutions in the world even today.
65
66
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book, noting the negative economies of scale inherent in SIFI’s,
concludes that “[t]he mega-banks offer no offsetting economic
benefit.”71 There is strong support for this claim;72 however, it
does not follow from the fact that the biggest banks suffer from
dis-economies of scale, that shuttering them by regulatory fiat
would be a net benefit. Indeed, the costs of imposing the
corporate death penalty on these institutions would be massive.
We know this, because we have witnessed the impact of the
failure of large financial institutions.73
Indeed, the book draws on two examples where criminal
prosecutions were pursued “with little regard for the collateral
consequences on a corporate defendant—including the essential
demise of the corporation’s business viability.”74 The authors
invoke these examples to emphasize that Wall Street following
the financial crisis was treated with kid gloves compared to
other institutions in other instances. The first of these examples,
Arthur Andersen, is problematic. While the example is useful to
illustrate that even one of the then-big 5 accounting firms would
face the full force of criminal prosecution, it arguably proves too
much. The demise of this firm is rarely cited as an example of
government getting it right. Tens of thousands of innocent
employees lost their jobs. Countless transactions were
disrupted. And power in the accounting world was consolidated
from a big-5 to a big-4.75 Peter Henning has argued that Arthur
Andersen’s demise was itself the anomaly,76 and many have
suggested that the failure of Arthur Andersen itself made
Id. at 15.
See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential
Risks of Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957, 1008 (1992) (“[S]tudies find decreasing
returns to scale (i.e., scale diseconomies) for very large banks (i.e., banks with assets greater
than $25 billion and possibly those with assets of $10 to $25 billion).” (emphasis omitted)).
73 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW
FOUNDATION 21 (2009), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_
web.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PBS-285Y]. (“The sudden failures of large U.S.-based
investment banks and of American International Group (AIG) were among the most
destabilizing events of the financial crisis. These companies were large, highly leveraged,
and had significant financial connections to the other major players in our financial
system . . . .”).
74 RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 5, at 42.
75 See Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution
in a Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1095, 1097 (2006). (The prosecution “effectively put the eighty-nine-year-old firm
out of business and forced tens of thousands of people to find new jobs. It also had a
dramatic effect on the accounting industry, by turning the ‘Big 5’ into the ‘Big 4.’”).
76 See Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for
Rehabilitation, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1418–19 (2009) (“[T]here have been no other
instances of a large firm suffering the same fate since then, even though other companies
have been charged with crimes and appear to have survived the ordeal, albeit quite a bit
worse for wear.”).
71
72
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federal prosecutors reluctant to take actions that could lead to
similar results.
The conduct of many in the financial industry has ranged
from unacceptably selfish to reprehensible. But I cannot with
any confidence predict what would happen were a regulator to
impose a corporate death penalty, and what we hear from those
in government during the crisis is that they worried about the
harm they might cause if they reacted to the crisis too severely.77
Mega-banks function in a wildly complex industry that spans
the globe and touches almost every person on the planet.78 This
uncertainty is almost surely a factor in explaining the reticence
of prosecutors and regulators to act more aggressively in the
wake of the crisis.
III.

THE CASE FOR THE LESS INNOCENT EXPLANATION

If lack of evidence and uncertainty about how to deal with
a historically unprecedented financial crisis are part of the
explanation, it does not follow that power and corruption cannot
factor in also.79 The authors’ careful compilation of known and
suspected frauds goes a long way toward convincing even the
skeptical reader that more ought to have been done. One can
quibble—and I have—with whether we can be confident that
there was sufficient evidence in any single case. And one can
raise concerns—as I have—about vengeance supplanting justice
and due process. But the facts are the facts, and the authors
have gathered more than enough to suggest that reference to
77 See Robert Litan, Financial Policy in A Trump Administration, 35 BANKING
& FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 30, 34 (2016) (“As two academic scholars, Professors Morgan
Ricks of Vanderbilt Law School and Professor Hal Scott of Harvard Law School have
outlined in their respective books on the topic, and as the memoirs of the leading
decision-makers during the 2008 financial crisis (Hank Paulson, Ben Bernanke, and Tim
Geithner) make clear, these short-term liabilities and the fear that they could spark a
‘run’ on all like instruments and the institutions that issued them were the real reasons
that the losses embedded in securities backed by subprime mortgages nearly caused the
financial system to freeze up and induced policy makers then to hastily arrange mergers
of large failing institutions with one another and ultimately to protect uninsured bank
creditors and MMF account holders, and to inject hundreds of billions of dollars in capital
into the nation’s banks (including all of the nine largest).”).
78 See Gilchrist, supra note 45, at 32.
79 Indeed, the book points to an intriguing shift in law enforcement between
the Bush and Obama administrations. Under President Bush, as late as fall 2008, there
were “three grand jury proceedings into the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, and the
press reported that DOJ issued dozens of subpoenas.” RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, CORPORATE
DEATH PENALTY, supra note 5, at 129. President Obama took office in January 2009, and
the authors were able to find “no indication of any material activity since then.” Id. Of
course, grand juries are somewhat protected by secrecy rules, and they certainly do not
publish reports when they fail to find sufficient evidence to bring charges, but this shift
between administrations does at least raise questions about the role of politics and
influence on the law enforcement response to the financial crisis.
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epistemic challenges alone cannot explain the lack of more
aggressive law enforcement actions following the crisis.80
In the case of Countrywide, a jury heard evidence and
returned a verdict that the company engaged in fraud.81 Judge
Rakoff, during the damages phase, described the fraud as
“brazen,” and concluded it “more than warrant[ed] a penalty” in
excess of $1 billion.82 Of course, this was a civil action, with a
lower standard of proof, but as the authors note, the findings in
the civil action were more than sufficient to establish probable
cause on which to pursue a criminal indictment. And more than
enough to justify a criminal investigation.83 “Yet, we have not
found any public indication of a grand jury inquiry, and no
criminal charges or pleas have been filed.”84
The SEC settlement with the former chief executives of
Countrywide is more troubling. The SEC action against the
former CEO, Angelo Mozilo, was settled for nearly $70 million
in fines and disgorgement, and a lifetime ban from serving as an
officer or director of a publicly traded company.85 Settlements
were also reached with the chief operating officer and chief
financial officer.86 These penalties are by any measure
significant, and would seem to undercut the argument that the
government failed to aggressively target those responsible for
80 Indeed, the authors are cautious throughout the book to note that they do
not know exactly which conduct by which people should have resulted in prosecutions;
only the government has the tools to gather the best information to resolve these
questions. See id. at xiii. The primary failure of law enforcement, according to the
authors, was not the lack of specific prosecutions, it was the federal government’s failure
to seriously investigate using the powerful tools at its disposal. Id. at 107. (“Given the
scale of the transactions tainted by strong indicia of fraud, criminal accountability or at
least investigations and trials should follow.” (emphasis added)).
81 Id. at 64.
82 Id.
83 Criminal investigations are not matters of public record, so one cannot make
a confident conclusion about what law enforcement resources were devoted to
investigations. However, the little we do know about investigative efforts is not comforting.
See Jesse Eisinger, Why Only One Top Banker Went to Jail for the Financial Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Apr. 30, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/magazine/only-one-topbanker-jail-financial-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/YAC8-93VP] (reporting that “to those
closest to the Lehman probe, the government’s case was seemingly conducted by one
lawyer, Bonnie Jonas, an assistant U.S. attorney for the Southern District”; this
characterization was disputed by the Southern District but specifics were not provided).
84 RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 5, at 68. As
the authors acknowledge, the Countrywide judgment was reversed on appeal. Id. at 65;
see also United States ex rel. O’Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 822 F.3d 650,
653 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he evidence at trial shows at most an intentional breach of
contract . . . and is insufficient as a matter of law to find fraud.”). This judgment itself
does not undermine the authors claim that more investigation would have been welcome.
On the other hand, that even the civil case failed to survive appeal does little to bolster
the contention that there should have been criminal prosecutions.
85 RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 5, at 66.
86 Id.
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the crisis. The book, however, maps a detailed timeline
suggesting that, even accounting for the penalties imposed,
crime may have paid.
In 2005, Countrywide established an internal policy of
“match[ing] the underwriting standards of any competitor.”87 The
chief risk officer objected that this strategy was unacceptably
dangerous, and by 2006, as evidence of that prediction mounted, he
complained that Countrywide was “ceding its risk policies to
competitors.”88 Mozilo was cognizant of the risks inherent in
products like no-down-payment loans, and he demanded corrective
action.89 Yet the company made no disclosures as to the level of risk
it was taking on through risky mortgages.90 As late as 2007, when
the dangers were increasingly evident, the risk officer actually
drafted and circulated (internally) language for the company’s
Form 10-K outlining the risks.91 Not only was this language
rejected, no disclosure of the enhanced lending risk was made.92
The book’s conclusion: “The SEC’s investigation, in short,
provided sufficient evidence of probable cause to seek the
indictment of CEO Mozilo, COO Sambol, and CFO Sieracki.”93
Of course, it does not follow that indictments would have
been proper. Probable cause is necessary, but not sufficient, to
support a federal indictment,94 and the presence of probable
cause is not itself a basis to dispute a declination decision. That
said, given the background outlined in the book, one cannot
ignore the distasteful similarities between the Keating Five
scandal95 during the S&L crisis and the Friends of Angelo
program at Countrywide. In both cases, powerful congressmen
received benefits from financial institutions and the financial
institutions avoided rigorous regulatory oversight.96 The
difference, of course, is that unlike Countrywide, the financial
institutions responsible for the S&L crisis, and their leaders,

Id. at 68.
Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 69.
91 Id. at 70.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 71.
94 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL §§ 9-27.200, 9-27.220,
https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution [https://perma.cc/
HB8X-P6RE].
95 See Archibald Cox, Ethics in Government: The Cornerstone of Public Trust,
94 W. VA. L. REV. 281, 282 (1992) (The Keating Five Scandal refers to the five U.S.
Senators who accepted “financial favors totaling almost $1,800,000 for their election
campaigns from Charles Keating, the political and financial promoter, and brought their
combined power and prestige to bear upon federal regulatory officials on his behalf.”).
96 RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 5, at 40, 79–81.
87
88
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were prosecuted and convicted.97 Certainly part of the explanation
for this difference lies in the size of the institutions and scope of the
problem.98 But the book contends it is something more: “One
lurking explanation for the government’s indulgence of such severe
criminality here involves Countrywide’s political influence.”99
The congressional inquiry into the Friends of Angelo
program found favorable loans were made to hundreds;
however—in part because there has been no more rigorous
criminal investigation—no complete list exists.100 We know
Countrywide enjoyed influence with the political elite, but we don’t
know its extent.101 We also know Countrywide and its leadership
escaped the more severe treatment seen following the S&L
Crisis.102 The open question is whether these facts are connected.
The answer to this question, I would suggest, is less
important than the pendency of the question itself. Failing to
answer this type of question is itself corrosive to our government
and our legal system. Yes, the 2008 financial crisis was unique,
and dwarfed the S&L crisis. Yes, securing evidence for a white
collar criminal prosecution is difficult, and in any particular
case it may be that the evidence was simply insufficient. But,
allowing to linger the question of whether the government’s
tepid response might be in part connected to the political
influence of elite banks and bankers cannot help but
undermine the perceived legitimacy of the legal system.
And the question is fueled only partially by programs like
Friends of Angelo. One would need to be naïve to ignore the
realities of campaign finance in considering whether political
favoritism is a factor in creating what appears to be a different
set of rules for Wall Street. Between the 1990s, through the
financial crisis, and continuing thereafter, the financial industry
represented the single largest source of federal campaign
contributions to both parties, and by a large margin.103 During
Id. at 40–41.
See supra text accompanying notes 65–78.
99 RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 5, at 84.
100 Id.
101 See STAFF REPORT OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 111TH
CONG., FRIENDS OF ANGELO: COUNTRYWIDE’S SYSTEMATIC AND SUCCESSFUL EFFORT TO BUY
INFLUENCE AND BLOCK REFORM 4 (2009), https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2012/02/20090319FriendsofAngelo.pdf [https://perma.cc/79GN-F8MK] (“To augment its voice
in the GSE-reform debate, Countrywide dispensed favors to VIPs who it believed might be
worthwhile to the company. This group of borrowers included legislators, congressional staffers,
lobbyists and other opinion leaders. Countrywide also distributed benefits to business partners,
local politicians, homebuilders, entertainers and law enforcement officials.”).
102 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
103 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning A Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps
Giving in to Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1363 (2013); see also RAMIREZ &
RAMIREZ, CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 5, at 96.
97
98
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the same period, the industry ranked third highest in lobbying
expenditures.104 Even without considering whether corporations
are people, whether money is speech, or whether people really
seek office to serve the public, it’s easy to see how the failure of
government to act against its greatest benefactor might
undermine public confidence in the justice system.
The authors set out to argue that there was a fundamental
breakdown in the rule of law in the wake of the financial crisis.105
Given the plurality of possible reasons for the lack of enforcement
actions—some of which would be not only entirely legitimate,
but also consistent with the rule of law—one need not accept this
conclusion. The authors, however, make such a strong case for
their thesis that it would be difficult to come away from this book
without a renewed concern that the credibility of the rule of law
has suffered gravely.
IV.

THE COST

The authors claim that “[c]itizens must now accept that
the government allowed the persons behind the most costly
fraud in our history to shirk all criminal and regulatory
responsibility.”106 It may seem petty to hinge so much on an
active verb, but as I’ve discussed above, the conclusion that the
government allowed this to occur is not inescapable. That said,
the real power of the authors’ claim remains unavoidable:
citizens must now accept that most of the persons behind the
most costly fraud in our history have avoided all criminal and
regulatory responsibility. And this avoidance of responsibility
sets a dangerous precedent. The accumulated wisdom from the
2008 crisis and its aftermath in the financial sector may not be
to exercise greater care; it may be that riskier conduct is more
lucrative because downsides like criminal and regulatory
penalties can be discounted. Or, as the authors write, “for the
most powerful financial elites at the apex of our economic
system, crime pays.”107
A brief review of post-crisis conduct by systemically
important financial institutions suggests cause for concern.
HSBC aided the laundering of hundreds of millions of dollars by
drug cartels and willfully committed serial violations of Office of
Foreign Assets Control sanctions.108 In what is perhaps an even
104
105
106
107
108

See Wilmarth, Jr. supra note 103, at 1363.
RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 5, at xii.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 194.
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more brazen scheme, five global banks “pleaded guilty to felony
charges arising from their manipulation of currency exchange
markets,” stemming from the LIBOR manipulations.109 Conduct by
the big banks seems to have gotten worse, not better. And isn’t this
what we’d expect if the external threat of penalties for potentially
profitable misconduct is shown to be toothless? Perhaps it doesn’t
matter so much why the financial crisis resulted in so few
prosecutions; the fact that it did generates the costs.
Of course, it does matter why. If the authors are correct
that a lack of political courage best explains the failure of
prosecutors and regulators to more aggressively respond in the
wake of the crisis, then we may need to fix the prosecutors and
regulators. Maybe. It is possible, however, that even if a lack of
political courage is the culprit, the fix should not be with those who
lacked courage, but rather with those who inspired the cowardice.
The best fix to the harms addressed by this book will
always rest with the banks. There may be innovative ideas about
how to further insulate prosecutors and regulators from
industry influence. However, if there is any part of our
government with a reason to be proud of its ability to resist
industry and political influence, it is our federal prosecutors.110
The authors demonstrate as much in the first chapter of their
book where they detail a history in which “even the most
powerful business leaders face[ ] criminal accountability for
significant financial crimes.”111 If anything changed between the
S&L crisis and the 2008 crisis, it wasn’t the independence or will
of our prosecutors; it was the target. In 2008, banks were bigger,
more interconnected, more systemically important, and more
powerful than they had been in the past, and the trend has not

Id. at 191–93.
I intentionally have elided the question of regulators here. There is
significantly more reason to question the independence and diligence of financial
regulators. See, e.g., U.S. SENATE, PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM.
ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOV’T AFFAIRS, U.S. VULNERABILITIES TO MONEY LAUNDERING,
DRUGS AND TERRORIST FINANCING: HSBC CASE HISTORY 282–335 (2012) (describing the
failure of the OCC to meaningfully regulate HSBC during its recent compliance failures).
Nor is the failure of regulators limited to a single incident. See OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER
OF CURRENCY, OFFICE OF ENTERPRISE GOVERNANCE & THE OMBUDSMAN 4 (2017), LESSONS
LEARNED REVIEW OF SUPERVISION OF SALES PRACTICES AT WELLS FARGO, https://
www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/pub-wells-fargosupervision-lessons-learned-41917.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2YV-M24X] (finding that “the
OCC did not take timely and effective supervisory actions after the bank and the OCC
identified significant issues with complaint management and sales practices”). A more
fulsome discussion of the problems of regulatory capture or impotence is beyond the scope
of this review.
111 RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 5, at 29.
109
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abated.112 Prosecutorial reticence, if that is a problem, can best
be addressed by confronting that which is causing the reticence:
institutions that are too big.
The sheer size and importance of banks is the problem
that leads to all three possible causes of the failure to prosecute
after the 2008 financial crisis. These institutions are massive
and opaque, and gathering evidence about individual actors
within them is particularly challenging.113 The risks of failure
are so great that any law enforcement or regulatory action that
generates these risks must be discounted.114 And, the power of
these institutions—whether in the form of revolving doors,
campaign influence, or sheer political might—may itself hinder
investigations and prosecutions.115
The end result may be a sense of immunity among some
in the financial industry and a loss of public confidence in law
enforcement. The authors describe this breakdown by
illustrating the “dimensions of lawlessness.”116 Describing four
post-crisis banking scandals, the authors contend that the
failure to prosecute has so diluted the deterrence effect of
criminal law as to render criminality increasingly common.117
According to the authors, the absence of prosecutions is
best explained by the influence that these organizations have
over our economy and government.118 Yet, even if we accept that
the failure to prosecute is explained by good reasons—lack of
evidence to establish scienter in individual cases, proper exercise
of prosecutorial discretion, prosecuting based on evidence rather
than outrage—the appearance of a soft response by law
enforcement generates costs. By this I do not mean to suggest that
prosecutions can be supported for purely instrumental reasons
absent evidence and desert. They cannot. However, the popular
perception of law enforcement’s response to the financial crisis
112 See John Crawford, Essay, A Better Way to Revive Glass-Steagall, 70 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 1, 1 (2017), https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/a-better-way-torevive-glass-steagall/ [https://perma.cc/S9NA-AJYG] (“Nearly a decade after the onset of
the crisis, the major financial conglomerates in the United States are in many cases
larger than they were in 2007.”).
113 See supra text accompanying notes 60–63.
114 See supra text accompanying notes 65–76.
115 See supra Part III.
116 RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 5, at 178.
117 Id.; see also Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Criminal Affirmance: Going Beyond the
Deterrence Paradigm to Examine the Social Meaning of Declining Prosecution of Elite
Crime, 45 CONN. L. REV. 865, 871 (2013) (“Just as the belief that punishment restores
order to society or communicates messages that may deter future wrongdoing,
affirmance stands for the proposition that not pursuing or not punishing elite crime
adequately can undermine the rule of law, diminish confidence in government, and
promote further costly criminality.” (emphasis omitted) (internal footnotes omitted)).
118 See RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 5, at 203.
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is that it cowed before Wall Street. The seeming lack of
investigations, not the lack of convictions, is the problem. It’s the
appearance that no one really tried. That perception persists, and it
undermines public confidence in the fairness of our justice system.
The book illustrates this cost well: the anemic law
enforcement response to the financial crisis and subsequent
misconduct by large financial institutions generates a public
perception that these institutions, and the elite who run them,
are above the law. A legal system that prosecutes based on
status does so at grave risk to its continued legitimacy.
The solution may be similar to, yet importantly different
than, that suggested by the book’s title. The Case for the
Corporate Death Penalty begins its conclusion with a quote from
Thomas Jefferson that “[l]egislators cannot invent too many
devices for subdividing property.”119 The authors write that
“[c]oncentrated power threatens the rule of law and therefore
individual liberty.”120 The big banks have become extremely big
and extremely powerful. Indeed, by some measures, large
financial institutions have become larger since the financial
crisis.121 The book notes that at the end of 2014 just five
institutions accounted for over 44 percent of the financial
industry in the United States.122
It is worth remembering that before “too big to fail”
became an epithet hurled by opponents of large financial
institutions, it was a widely embraced policy.123 Too big to fail
was the federal bank regulators’ policy, established in the 1980s,
of protecting “both insured and uninsured depositors in large
failing banks.”124 In the decades preceding the 2008 crisis, the
dispute was generally not about whether this informal federal
insurance was a good idea; rather, the question was whether the
trend toward consolidation within the financial industry would
increase the costs of this policy.125 Those who favored

119 Id. at 203 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Oct.
28, 1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 681, 632 (Julian P. Boyd
ed., 1953)).
120 Id.
121 See Partnoy & Eisinger, supra note 30 (“Banks today are bigger and more
opaque than ever, and they continue to behave in many of the same ways they did before
the crash.”).
122 See RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 5, at 108.
123 The purpose of the policy was to prevent instability within one large bank from
spreading to other large banks, or even further throughout the regional or national economy,
as well as to mirror the regulatory policy of other industrial nations allowing U.S. banks to
compete for international deposits. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 103, at 997–1002.
124 Id. at 994.
125 Id.

2018]

OPACITY, FAGILITY, & POWER

671

consolidation prevailed, leaving the opponents with only
cassandran validation.126
The sheer size and importance of the largest banks has
rendered them not only too big to fail but also too big to police.
Too big to police because in all but the most unusual scenarios
even fulsome, expensive, and intrusive investigations are likely
to return evidence of scienter against relatively low-level
employees. This problem is not limited to banks, but it is true of
large banks. Simply as a matter of corporate hierarchy and
function, actual decisions and awareness of conditions necessary
to commit a crime will be aggregated at lower levels of
management.127 So, efforts like the Yates Memorandum128 that
call for more individual prosecutions are unlikely to have much
impact, except, possibly, undermining the corporate function by
poisoning the relationship between senior management and
employees129 and generating inconsequential cases against
lower-level employees.130
The death penalty is not a realistic option for these
largest banks, nor is it one we ought to hope prosecutors exercise
at times of crisis. A better option may be a compelled diet.
Neither line prosecutors nor even DOJ leadership are situated to
restructure our economy by breaking up the biggest banks; this is
a political project that ought to be handled with care. “Killing”
large banks might feel good, but it would be reckless. If the large
banks are to end, it will and ought to be through the relatively
gentle and thoughtful mechanics of politically imposed limits.
CONCLUSION
The political battle over the financial industry continues
to be waged—not between Democrats and Republicans or right
and left, but between those who worry about the consequences
126 Id. at 1081 (“[I]t is clear that a consolidated banking industry dominated by
nationwide banks would impose greater risks on the FDIC in view of the ‘too big to fail’ policy.”).
127 See generally Gregory M. Gilchrist, Accountability for Corporate Crime, 34
GA. ST. L. REV. 335 (2018).
128 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy
Att’y Gen., to All U.S. Attorneys et al., (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/
769036/download [https://perma.cc/RZN9-TUZQ].
129 See Sharon Oded, Coughing Up Executives or Rolling the Dice?: Individual
Accountability for Corporate Corruption, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 49, 53 (2016) (describing
the conflict between corporations and their employees generated by the Yates Memo).
130 See Gilchrist, supra note 127 (“Simply put, the hierarchy and structure of
corporations mean that most corporate acts occur at levels many steps removed from
central management.”); see also Peter J. Henning, A New Crime for Corporate
Misconduct?, 84 MISS. L.J. 43, 51 (2014) (“Many corporate officials are far removed from
the day-to-day company decisions that can turn out to be fraudulent, so it is difficult to
find evidence to establish their knowledge in the circumstantial evidence.”).
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of the largest banks’ great size, wealth, and power, and those
who defend the status quo. There is no avoiding the fact that
many of the defenders of large banks in this battle are themselves
subject to an obvious conflict of interest. Their campaigns, and
hence their livelihood and power, are funded in significant part
by contributions from large financial institutions and the culture
that surround them.
The fight over the control of wealth, and all that
accompanies it, continues. We ought to expect that those who
control and profit from the flow of money will continue to
innovate. Some innovations will help the nation and the people,
while others will serve only the banks and bankers. Some
innovations will be morally sound, while others will teeter
toward recklessness and sometimes outright fraud.
This is not new. It’s worth remembering that after
President Jackson prevailed in his war against the Second Bank
of the United States, its president, Nicholas Biddle, morphed the
institution to a private corporation chartered by Pennsylvania.131
When that bank failed, Biddle and other officers were indicted for
fraud.132 The cases were dismissed, but not before the court took the
opportunity to comment on “‘the singularly loose method’ by which
the directors had conducted the business of the corporation.”133
The Case for the Corporate Death Penalty adds powerful
support to the arguments in favor of breaking up the largest
banks. Whatever the reason—be it corruption, opacity,
importance to the economy—history has demonstrated that
large banks are less subject to external norms. There is just way
too much room for clever people buried in the corporate form to
identify new means of profit that, while untoward, immoral, and
possibly illegal, will never face a real risk of prosecution.
Fraud is notoriously difficult to define, and this is almost
surely by design.134 The line between brilliantly making money
and breaking the law can be hazy, and in some cases impossible
to discern ex ante. For these reasons, criminal law is often not
an effective or just mechanism for confronting financial
misconduct. That said, there is a line and it will be crossed.
See Hammond, supra note 2, at 11.
See THOMAS PAYNE GOVAN, supra note 55, at 411–12; Hammond, supra
note 2, at 15.
133 Hammond, supra note 2, at 16 n.49 (quoting the PHILA. PUBLIC LEDGER,
Apr. 30, 1842).
134 See Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 520
(2011) (“Fraud can have fixed meaning only at a very general level. If one attempts to
key one’s definition of fraud to descriptions of behaviors, new behaviors will inevitably
be invented, or will simply arise, that expose the definition as faulty and
underinclusive.”).
131
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When it is, there need be consequences. The authors urge more
criminal consequences. I would urge more regulatory protections
and consequences. But we agree consequences are necessary,
and as The Case for the Corporate Death Penalty makes clear, on
Wall Street, too often, there are none.

